Omnes Vulnerant, Postuma Necat; All the Hours Wound, the Last One Kills: The Lengthy Stay on Death Row in America by Tongue, Mary Elizabeth
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 80 
Issue 3 Summer 2015 Article 13 
Summer 2015 
Omnes Vulnerant, Postuma Necat; All the Hours Wound, the Last 
One Kills: The Lengthy Stay on Death Row in America 
Mary Elizabeth Tongue 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mary Elizabeth Tongue, Omnes Vulnerant, Postuma Necat; All the Hours Wound, the Last One Kills: The 
Lengthy Stay on Death Row in America, 80 MO. L. REV. (2015) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss3/13 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
 LAW SUMMARY 
Omnes Vulnerant, Postuma Necat; All the 
Hours Wound, the Last One Kills: The 
Lengthy Stay on Death Row in America 
MEGAN ELIZABETH TONGUE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Bureau of Justice Statistics has compiled statistical analyses show-
ing that the average amount of time an inmate spends on death row has stead-
ily increased over the past thirty years.1  In fact, the shortest average amount 
of time an inmate spent on death row during that time period was seventy-one 
months in 1985, or roughly six years, with the longest amount of time being 
198 months, or sixteen and one half years, in 2012.2  This means that the 
amount of time an inmate spends on death row has almost tripled over the 
past few decades.3 
Missouri has increased its rate of executions in recent years and tied 
with Texas for administering the most executions in 2014.4  Between 1989 
and 2014, the average stay on death row in Missouri was a little over twelve 
years, with the average stay for Missouri prisoners between 2013 and 2014 
being roughly twenty years.5  With the rapid rate of executions, a Missouri 
post-conviction attorney reports that her clients are now becoming “more 
stressed,” as inmates that her clients have been living with for ten to fifteen 
 
* B.A. Stephens College, 2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2016; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2015–2016.  I would 
like to thank Dr. Paul Litton for reviewing this Note and mentoring me throughout the 
writing process.  I would also like to thank Val Leftwich for allowing me to interview 
her about her inspiring work as a post-conviction attorney with the Missouri State 
Public Defender.  A special thank you needs to be given to my undergraduate mentor, 
Alexandria Zylstra, for introducing me to this topic and encouraging me to pursue this 
career.  I will be forever grateful to her. 
 1. Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment 2012 – Statistical Tables, BUREAU JUST. 
STATISTICS at table 10 (May 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp12st.pdf.  
See Figure 1 infra p. 920. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-
1976 (last visited June 22, 2015). 
 5. Executions: 1989–2014, MO. DEATH ROW, http://missourideathrow.com/ 
executions-1989-2009/ (last visited June 22, 2015). 
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years are just now being executed.6  Arizona, Georgia, Florida, Missouri, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas are the only states to have executed any of their 
death row inmates in the past year.7  Many states have only executed three or 
fewer inmates since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976; yet, they 
continue to retain the death penalty as a potential punishment for first-degree 
murder.8 
Although many states rarely, if ever, execute their inmates, all states that 
currently have the death penalty have inmates on their death row.9  How long 
is too long for these inmates to wait for a punishment they may never re-
ceive?  If states are unwilling or unable to execute in a timely fashion, then 
are these inmates effectively experiencing life without parole with only the 
remote possibility of death at the hands of the state? 
Why inmates spend so long on death row and the accompanying mental 
ramifications are discussed in Part II.  Part III discusses the response of 
American courts to the lengthy stays of inmates on death row.  Next, Part IV 
discusses the international opinion on America’s lengthy stay on death row, 
international tribunal holdings on the matter, the philosophical implications 
of a lengthy stay on death row, and possible solutions.  Finally, Part V con-
cludes this Note, finding that abolition of the death penalty is the best solu-
tion. 
II.  BACKGROUND: THE CONSEQUENCES OF A LONG STAY ON DEATH 
ROW 
This Part discusses the appeals process for death row inmates and addi-
tionally exposes some of the factors giving rise to the lengthy stay on death 
row.  Following that, Part II.B. describes the mental suffering that an inmate 
endures while on death row, and Part II.C. defines “Death Row Phenome-
non.” 
A.  Why the Long Wait? 
The reason there is so much time between sentencing and execution is 
the appellate process.  If a defendant is sentenced to death after the guilt and 
sentencing phases of trial, his sentence is automatically appealed to the state’s 
 
 6. Interview with Valerie Leftwich, Post-Conviction Attorney, Missouri State 
Public Defender, in Columbia, Mo. (Oct. 10, 2014). 
 7. Execution List 2014, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/execution-list-2014 (last visited June 22, 2015). 
 8. Number of Executions by State and Region, supra note 4.  These states in-
clude: Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Wyoming, and the 
U.S. Government.  Id. 
 9. Death Row Inmates by State and Size of Death Row by Year, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-
size-death-row-year?scid=9&did=188 (last visited June 22, 2015). 
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss3/13
2015] OMNES VULNERANT, POSTUMA NECANT 899 
highest court.10  Then, if the conviction is not overturned, the defendant can 
petition the Supreme Court of the United States on federal constitutional 
grounds.11  If the Supreme Court denies certiorari, the defendant can then 
make a state post-conviction appeal to the original trial court judge.12 
It is on this post-conviction appeal to the original trial court judge that 
the defendant can raise issues outside of the record, such as incompetent 
counsel, new evidence, Brady violations, etc.13  After appealing to the trial 
court judge, the defendant can subsequently appeal to the state’s intermediate 
appellate court and then to the state’s highest court.14  If the state’s highest 
court upholds the conviction, the defendant can petition the Supreme Court of 
the United States again on issues outside of the record.15 
If the defendant appeals to the Supreme Court, and certiorari is denied, 
state appeals have been exhausted.16  It is at this point that the defendant can 
move on to federal appeals, starting with a federal habeas corpus petition, 
which is limited to federal issues and is filed with the U.S. District Court.17  If 
the U.S. District Court hears the case, the defendant can appeal to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals.18  If the Court of Appeals overturns the conviction, the 
state may have the opportunity to re-try the defendant, which starts the appel-
late process all over again.19  But, if the Court of Appeals upholds the de-
fendant’s conviction, a final appeal can be made to the Supreme Court of the 
United States.20  After that appeal, the defendant has effectively exhausted all 
possible appeals, but can now file for executive clemency with the governor, 
who can grant the defendant more time before execution or a lesser sen-
tence.21  If these petitions fail, then an execution warrant is either issued by 
the governor, the state’s highest court, or the trial court judge.  Generally, the 
department of corrections only has so much time to fulfill that warrant and 
 
 10. Death Penalty Appeals Process, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONTEXT, 
http://www.capitalpunishmentincontext.org/resources/dpappealsprocess (last visited 
June 22, 2015). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that prosecutorial 
misconduct via withholding evidence can lead to defendant’s death sentence being 
overturned). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  When the conviction is overturned, “[T]he court shall vacate and set the 
judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial 
or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2012). 
 20. Death Penalty Appeals Process, supra note 10. 
 21. Id. 
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execute the prisoner.22  But, in many instances, courts or the governor’s coun-
sel take many years to issue these warrants, which is why states like Kansas 
have prisoners on death row but have not executed anyone since 1976.23 
These appeals take several years, if not decades, to complete.  In attempt 
to limit the number of years these appeals can take, Congress enacted the 
Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) in 1996 to create a 
statute of limitations on federal appeals from state judgments in death penalty 
cases.24  The state is still able to decide how many appeals the defendant may 
have within that state, but the AEDPA limits how many appeals the federal 
government can allow.25  If the defendant wishes to file a second appeal in 
federal court, it will be dismissed, except under exceptional circumstances, 
and a second appeal will only be heard if the Court of Appeals allows the 
District Court to hear it.26  Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has only thirty 
days to make this decision after the petition is filed.27  This causes an abbre-
viated timeline for the federal appeals process. 
Another outcome of the AEDPA is that federal courts are now required 
to give priority to death penalty cases “over all noncapital matters.”28  In the-
ory, this would assist in shortening the length of stay on death row by encour-
aging judges to hear capital cases before other hearings on their docket.  Part 
of the intent of the AEDPA is to keep defendants from abusing the habeas 
corpus process and to shorten the delay between sentencing and execution.29 
However, Valerie Leftwich, a post-conviction capital defense attorney 
in Missouri, stated that the AEDPA actually hurts capital cases by streamlin-
 
 22. For example, an execution in Kentucky should be carried out on the fifth 
Friday following the affirmation of the sentence by the Supreme Court of Kentucky.  
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.218 (1980).  If the execution does not take place on the 
day appointed, the governor can appoint a different day of execution and keep doing 
so until the sentence is ultimately carried out.  Id. 
 23. Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976, supra note 4. 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (“No circuit or district judge shall be required to enter-
tain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person 
pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States if it appears that the legality of 
such detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior 
application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . .”); id. § 2244(d)(1) (“A 1-year period of 
limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”). 
 25. Id. § 2244(b)(1) (“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus 
application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dis-
missed.”). 
 26. Id. § 2244(b)(4) (“A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a 
second or successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be filed 
unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of this section.”). 
 27. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(D). 
 28. Id. § 2266(a). 
 29. James Robertson, Quo Vadis, Habeas Corpus?, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1063, 1082 
(2008). 
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ing the appellate process.30  These shortened periods take away the necessary 
time to investigate issues on appeal, which prevents her from providing the 
quality of counsel she wants to provide.31  Ultimately, the AEDPA makes her 
job more difficult, but she admits that Congress has met its goal because this 
statute speeds up executions.32  But does abbreviating the federal appeals 
process make the death penalty any more effective if the appropriate amount 
of time required to build an adequate defense is unavailable? 
As a result of the lengthy appeals process, an inmate can spend an inor-
dinate amount of time on death row awaiting his sentence.  But what effect 
does this have on him?  What are the psychological consequences of telling 
someone he has been sentenced to death and then asking him to sit and wait 
years for his execution day to come? 
B.  Psychological Ramifications of the Lengthy Stay 
Dr. Johnnie L. Gallemore, Jr., completed a study on eight men who were 
sentenced to death and noted the effect their prison time had on them.33  Ac-
cording to Dr. Gallemore, one of the “most stressful of all human experiences 
is the anticipation of death at a specific moment in time and in a known man-
ner.”34  Dr. Gallemore conducted numerous medical tests on these inmates 
over a two-year period to see how the health of the inmates changed while on 
death row.35 
He found what was to be expected: severe depression.36  During obser-
vation, one of the inmates seemed to reach a state of total psychosis from his 
experiences on death row, and upon further study, showed that he was suffer-
ing from extreme paranoia and delusions.37  Another inmate showed signs of 
depression upon the initial interview and by the end of the two-year period 
had resorted to severe self-mutilation.38  A third inmate appeared adequate 
after the first interview, but by the end of Dr. Gallemore’s study, the inmate 
had been psychiatrically evaluated twenty-five times, complaining of insom-
nia and anxiety, and requesting a multitude of medications.39  He was hospi-
talized after only twenty months on death row because he hoarded the medi-
 
 30. Interview with Valerie Leftwich, supra note 6. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Johnnie L. Gallemore, Jr., M.D. & James H. Panton, M.A., Inmate Responses 
to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167, 167 (Aug. 1972). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 170. 
 37. Id. at 169. 
 38. Id.  “[The inmate] stuck a staple and a broken ice cream spoon into his arm 
‘just to see the blood.’”  Id. 
 39. Id. 
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cation he had received and suffered a serious drug overdose.40  It remains 
unclear whether suicide was his intention.41 
This study came at a very interesting time in this country’s history of 
imposing the death penalty.  It was in 1972 that Dr. Gallemore’s article was 
published, which was the same year that the Supreme Court of the United 
States struck down the states’ death penalty statutes, as their implementation 
was considered unconstitutional.42  Dr. Gallemore cautioned that if the death 
penalty were not reinstated, careful consideration would need to be given to 
those that had already spent so long on death row.43  He warned that, in states 
where a commuted life sentence may offer an opportunity for parole, death 
row inmates may not be able to safely reenter society, and they may pose a 
danger to the public as a result of the psychological toll of death row.44 
In the years since Dr. Gallemore’s study, psychiatrists have been diag-
nosing the psychosis that accompanies time spent on death row as “Death 
Row Syndrome.”45  Death Row Syndrome is a compilation of the physical, 
experimental, and temporal aspects of death row.46  The physical aspect of the 
syndrome is something that many prisoners face, whether on death row or 
not, which results from horrible prison conditions – such as, cramped cells, 
limited human contact, constant surveillance, etc.47  The experimental aspect 
is the constant fear of knowing that you are going to die.48  Finally, the tem-
poral aspect is in reference to the decades a prisoner can spend on death 
row.49  Taken together, these three elements constitutes Death Row Syn-
drome, which often leads to suicidal tendencies and frequent waivers of ap-
peals to expedite the execution process and end the torture.50 
Dr. Stuart Grassian coined the term “Death Row Syndrome” in 1986.51  
The conditions he described in his research of fourteen inmates on death row 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 171.  See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that current 
death penalty legislation is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause). 
 43. Gallemore, supra note 33 at 171. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Patricia Cooper, Competency of Death Row Inmates to Waive the Right to 
Appeal: A Proposal to Scrutinize the Motivations of Death Row Volunteers and to 
Consider the Impact of Death Row Syndrome in Determining Competency, 28 DEV. IN 
MENTAL HEALTH L. 2, 106 (Jul. 2009). 
 46. Id. at 119. 
 47. Id. at 120. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Harold I. Schwartz, M.D., Death Row Syndrome and Demoralization: Psy-
chiatric Means to Social Policy Ends, 33 J. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 
150, 153–55 (2005). 
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were much worse than death row conditions today.52  Dr. Grassian described 
twenty-three hours a day of unbroken confinement in a six- by nine-foot win-
dowless cell with only a steel bed, table, and stool; a situation that would 
leave any person in a state of psychosis, whether he was to be executed or 
not.53  Psychiatrists argue that, even though the conditions are not as harsh 
today as they were twenty years ago, the combination of confinement and 
anxiety concerning an impending execution can still leave inmates in a state 
of psychosis.54  A problem lies with whether to diagnose Death Row Syn-
drome as a mental illness that may leave an inmate incompetent and, there-
fore, insane and ineligible for execution, as laid out in Ford v. Wainwright.55 
In 1986, in Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that a state could not execute someone deemed to be insane (and there-
fore incompetent).56  From the Supreme Court’s perspective, an incompetent 
person cannot be executed because he will not know why he is being pun-
ished and will not understand the implications of this penalty.57  Alvin Ford 
had spent a total of eleven years on death row and it was during that time that 
he became psychotic.58  A psychiatrist was forced to make the distinction 
between competence and incompetence, knowing that his determination 
could be lethal to his patient.59  This left the psychiatrist in a quagmire, forc-
ing him to either spare a man’s life or condemn him to death, which is a very 
difficult situation for a psychiatrist to be put in.60 
Dr. Harold I. Schwartz, Psychiatrist-in-Chief at Hartford Hospital in 
Hartford, Connecticut, found that if Death Row Syndrome can be used to find 
an inmate incompetent, then this would lead to the abolition of the death pen-
alty via psychiatry.61  Dr. Schwartz worried that the law will try to ride on the 
coattails of psychiatry to end the death penalty, but he wanted policy makers 
to understand that Death Row Syndrome is not an easily diagnosable or wide-
ly recognized mental illness.62  Therefore, should a diagnosis of Death Row 
Syndrome excuse an inmate from execution or would this lead to further 
complications between a court’s judgment and a psychiatrist’s diagnosis? 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 56. Id. at 417–18. 
 57. Id. at 417. 
 58. Douglas A. Sargent, Treating the Condemned to Death, 16 HASTINGS CTR. 
REPORT, no. 6, Dec. 1986, at 5.  Douglas A. Sargent is an M.D., J.D., and was director 
of the Neuroscience Consultation Group.  Id. 
 59. Id. 
        61. Id. 
 61. Schwartz, supra note 51, at 154.  Dr. Schwartz believes in the abolishment of 
the death penalty but fears that there is a confusion between Death Row Syndrome 
and “morbid existential distress” or “demoralization syndrome,” which is where ter-
minally ill patients wish to cease treatment.  Id. 
 62. Id. at 155. 
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C.  Application of Death Row Syndrome 
Anticipation of death is an extremely stressful factor for death row in-
mates.63  After clinical evaluations and psychological testing, researchers 
have concluded that there is a certain hardening of the “psychological defens-
es” of death row inmates.64  Even though the findings determined that an 
inmate is able to adapt to death row, the adaptation leaves only the shell of a 
person, one who is socially undesirable.65  A good example of one such 
“shell” is serial killer Michael Ross, who was involved in the first case that 
addressed Death Row Syndrome. 
Michael Ross was forty-five years old when he was executed for mur-
dering four women in Connecticut in the 1980s.66  Ross admitted to killing 
eight women in a crime spree covering five states.67  Ross, a criminal whom 
society had little to no sympathy for, waived each of his appeals and admitted 
he wanted to die.68  It was his court-appointed attorneys and his father who 
attempted to halt the execution by claiming that Ross was incompetent to 
waive appeal.69 
After Ross’s conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct ap-
peal, Ross attempted to waive further appeal and post-conviction review of 
his sentence, but his counsel argued that the mental disorders Ross developed 
while on death row made him incompetent to waive appeal.70  The day before 
Ross’s execution was held, Judge Chatigny of the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Connecticut had a telephone conference with the attorneys handling 
the case and shared his concern about a letter he received from Ross’s cell-
mate, who claimed that the conditions of death row may have affected Ross’s 
competence.71  Judge Chatigny further expressed concern that Dr. Michael 
Norko, the psychiatrist who found Ross competent for execution,72 was not 
familiar with Death Row Syndrome.73  Judge Chatigny even threatened one 
of Ross’s attorneys with the loss of his license if it turned out that Ross was 
executed even though he was incompetent because he suffered from Death 
Row Syndrome.74  The Supreme Court of Connecticut ultimately concluded 
that, even though Ross had a mental disorder, it did not substantially affect 
 
 63. Marianne C. Kastrup, Psychiatry and the Death Penalty, J. MED. ETHICS 171, 
182 (1988). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Connecticut Serial Killer Put to Death, CNN (May 13, 2005, 5:03 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/05/13/ross.execution/. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131, 133 (Conn. 2005). 
 71. Id. at 137. 
 72. Id. at 135. 
 73. Id. at 137. 
 74. Id. at 138. 
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his ability to waive appeal.75  This case was revolutionary because it was the 
first to address Death Row Syndrome and allowed the discussion to expand 
beyond “medical literature” and into “legal literature.”76 
The overlap between “medical literature” and “legal literature” began 
with Ross in regards to the psychological effects of time spent on death row.77  
The argument presented was whether it was cruel and unusual to keep some-
one in a state of anxiety about his life for such a long time and then execute 
him.  Several courts have addressed the issue, but the majority has dismissed 
this argument by shifting responsibility for resolution between legislatures, 
federal courts, and state courts, or by finding that the lengthy amount of time 
is inevitable or constitutionally acceptable. 
III.  AMERICAN COURTS ON THE LENGTH OF STAY ON DEATH ROW 
American courts acknowledge that inmates spend an inordinate amount 
of time on death row, and even admit that that time spent may be horrible to 
endure.  It was not until recently that one court came forward and found that a 
substantial delay in execution can no longer be tolerated.78  But, this court is 
in the minority.  American courts continue, and have for many years, to allow 
an inmate to suffer through the dregs of endless appeals and the mental illness 
that potentially accompanies it. 
A.  The History of Lengthy Stays on Death Row 
In 1890, in the case In re Medley, the state of Colorado allowed Medley, 
who was sentenced to death, to remain totally ignorant of the day or time he 
was to be executed.79  The Supreme Court of the United States held that Med-
ley, having been denied the knowledge of when his execution was to take 
place, was being subjected to an additional punishment.80  The Court held 
that Medley could only receive punishments that were prescribed by sover-
eign authority, which did not include the authority of the prison warden 
where Medley was being held.81  The Supreme Court determined that when a 
prisoner is confined and awaiting his impending execution, he is subjected to 
“one of the most horrible feelings,” which “is the uncertainty during the 
whole of it.”82  It is the “immense mental anxiety” caused by the uncertainty 
 
 75. Id. at 149 (emphasis added). 
 76. Id. at 137 n.6. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See infra Part III.D. 
 79. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890) (“[T]he prisoner is to be kept in utter 
ignorance of the day and hour when his mortal life shall be terminated by hanging, 
until the moment arrives when this act is to be done.”). 
 80. Id. at 172–73. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 172.   
9
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of the execution day that the Court considered to be an additional punishment 
and, therefore, improperly given by the warden.83 
In 1959, the Supreme Court of California found that a stay of more than 
eleven years on death row was definitely unusual and that there was “no 
doubt that mental suffering attends such detention.”84  The court made this 
observation in response to defendant Chessman’s Eighth Amendment cruel 
and unusual punishment claim about his lengthy stay on death row.85  Ulti-
mately, the California court held that there was no cruel and unusual punish-
ment imposed on Chessman.86  This was not the only state court to discuss 
the length of stay on death row, but like Chessman, all courts, whether federal 
or state, ultimately rejected this claim.87  It was not until 1995 that the Su-
preme Court even considered reviewing the claim of the unconstitutionality 
of a lengthy stay on death row. 
B.  The “Lackey” Claim 
Clarence Lackey was convicted of capital murder in 1977 for the death 
of Diane Kumph.88  A final conviction and schedule for execution was not 
granted to Lackey until seventeen years later due to two mandatory appeals in 
Texas state courts and federal habeas corpus proceedings.89  In 1995, the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari to hear Lackey’s novel Eighth Amendment 
claim that an inordinate delay of execution was cruel and unusual punish-
ment.90 
Justice Stevens wrote a memorandum in dissent of the denial of certiora-
ri.91  In his memorandum, he stated that the Supreme Court permitted capital 
punishment because the Framers accepted the death penalty and because it 
served the necessary purposes of retribution and deterrence.92  Justice Stevens 
argued that Lackey’s stay on death row for seventeen years would have been 
rare and unusual to the Framers and, “[A]fter such an extended time, the ac-
 
 83. Id. 
 84. People v. Chessman, 341 P.2d 679, 699 (Cal. 1959) (en banc) overruled in 
part on other grounds by People v. Morse, 388 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1964) (en banc). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See U.S. ex rel. Townsend v. Twomey, 452 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding 
that Townsend’s sentence must be vacated due to improper voir dire and noting the 
unfairness of his fifteen year confinement on death row); Richmond v. Ricketts, 640 
F.Supp. 767, 803 (D. Ariz. 1986) (holding that Richmond’s claim of long confine-
ment on death row served no penal purpose and was therefore meritless). 
 88. Lackey v. State, 638 S.W.2d 439, 439 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 1982). 
 89. Brief for Petitioner, Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (No. 94-8262), 
1995 WL 17904041, at *ii. 
 90. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Agreeing with Justice Ste-
vens, Justice Breyer thinks this issue is “an important undecided one.”). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)). 
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ceptable state interest in retribution has arguably been satisfied by the severe 
punishment already inflicted.”93  Justice Stevens also found that spending 
seventeen years on death row lowers the deterrent value of a death sentence 
since there is minimal difference (at the current rate of execution) between 
death and life without parole.94  According to Justice Stevens, if these pur-
poses are not served, then capital punishment should be considered cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.95  Justice Stevens further 
noted that this case is one that would need to be examined further in the state 
courts and “seem[ed] an ideal example of one which would benefit from such 
further study.”96  Since Justice Stevens’s memorandum in Lackey, there have 
been several additional cases where the Supreme Court denied certiorari on 
the supposed unconstitutionality of a lengthy stay on death row, and Justices 
continue to write memoranda either in concurrence or dissent of the denial.97 
In 1999, the Supreme Court again denied certiorari to hear the cases of 
Thomas Knight and Carey Moore, both of whom sought relief under the 
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause for their lengthy 
stays on death row.98  Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Breyer each wrote 
memoranda either in concurrence or dissent of the denial of certiorari.99  Jus-
tice Stevens emphasized that when a petition is denied certiorari, it does not 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  See, e.g., Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he deterrent value of incarceration during that period of uncertainty 
may well be comparable to the consequences of the ultimate step itself.”). 
 95. Id.  See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring) 
(“[When the death penalty] ceases realistically to further these purposes, . . . its impo-
sition would then be the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal 
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.  A penalty with such negli-
gible returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punish-
ment violative of the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 96. Id.  See, e.g., McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (“[When cer-
tiorari is denied on an important topic, the state and federal courts will] serve as la-
boratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed by this 
Court.”). 
 97. See Carpenter v. Gomez, 516 U.S. 981 (1995) (cert. denied); Gomez v. Fier-
ro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) (cert. was granted, but the Court did not make a ruling and 
remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (cert. 
denied); Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459 (1999) (cert. denied); Foster v. Florida, 537 
U.S. 990 (2002) (cert. denied); Allen v. Ornoski, 546 U.S. 1136 (2006) (cert. denied) 
(raising the question as to whether a blind, diabetic, wheel-chair-bound, 76-year-old 
man’s death sentence would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.); Smith v. Ari-
zona, 552 U.S. 985 (2007) (cert. denied); Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541 (2009) 
(cert. denied); Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1 (2011) (cert. denied); Muhammad v. 
Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894 (2014) (cert. denied). 
 98. Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. at 459. 
 99. Id. 
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make the claim meritless.100  Justice Thomas, in concurrence of the denial of 
certiorari, found no American “tradition” or precedent to support this kind of 
claim.101  He asked the Court to reflect on the “experiment” that Justice Ste-
vens suggested in Lackey v. Texas and consider what that experiment con-
cluded, implying that the states have formed their own conclusions on the 
topic – finding it meritless.102 
Finally, Justice Breyer commented at length on not only the unconstitu-
tionality of the lengthy stays on death row the defendants were enduring, but 
also how international courts have handled this question.103  Justice Breyer 
disagreed with Justice Thomas that the Lackey experiment has come to a 
close because only four of the eight cases Justice Thomas mentioned support-
ed his conclusion.104  Justice Breyer believed the Lackey claim should be 
decided by the Court because, “Where a delay, measured in decades, reflects 
the State’s own failure to comply with the Constitution’s demands, the claim 
that time has rendered execution inhuman is a particularly strong one.”105 
In 2009, the Supreme Court of the United States again denied certiorari 
to hear the case of Cecil Johnson, who waited nearly twenty-nine years on 
death row.106  Justices Stevens and Breyer wrote a memorandum disagreeing 
with the denial of certiorari.107  The Justices determined that executing John-
son after this length of time would be “inhumane” and stated they would have 
granted Johnson’s petition for certiorari.108  They believed that “state-caused 
delay in state-sponsored killings can be unacceptably cruel.”109  The Justices 
also considered this case to be worthy of certiorari because Johnson brought 
 
 100. Id.  See, e.g., Barber v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1184 (1995) (opinion of Ste-
vens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). 
 101. Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 459.  Justice Thomas does not support reliance “on the 
European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme 
Court of India, or the Privy Council.”  Id. 
 102. Id. at 461.  See, e.g., People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 262 (Cal. 1998); People v. 
Massie, 967 P.2d 29, 44–45 (Cal. 1998); Ex parte Bush, 695 So. 2d 138, 140 (Ala. 
1997); State v. Schackart, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (Ariz. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 862 
(1998); Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 522 U.S. 827 (1997); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1287–88 (Mont. 1996); 
White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 438–39 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 911 
(1996); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995).  “Each of these cases 
rejected the [Lackey] claim on the merits.”  Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. at 460–61. 
 103. Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 462–64.  See supra Part II.  International courts will be 
discussed in a subsequent section.  See infra Part IV. 
 104. Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 464–65.  See Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35 (20 years; 
conviction overturned once); Ex parte Bush, 695 So. 2d 138 (16 years; conviction 
overturned twice); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272 (13 years; sentence overturned 
once); People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29 (16 years; sentence overturned once). 
 105. Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 461. 
 106. Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541 (2009). 
 107. Id. at 542. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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his Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, whereas earlier claims 
had been brought under the doctrine of habeas corpus.110  This was novel to 
the Justices, who felt it was important to address whether a Lackey claim is 
recognizable under this statute.111  Justices Stevens and Breyer thought it 
regrettable that other Justices continued to find the Lackey claim without 
enough merit to warrant the Court’s attention.112 
Justice Thomas concurred with the denial of certiorari and determined 
that Johnson brought about his own lengthy stay on death row by continuing 
to unsuccessfully challenge his death sentence by appealing to state and fed-
eral courts and petitioning for executive clemency.113  Justice Thomas found 
no support for the Lackey claim in the Constitution, legislation, or common 
law.114  He concluded that as long as defendants have the “procedural safe-
guards” the Court has always supported, “[D]efendants who avail themselves 
of these procedures will face the delays Justice Stevens laments.”115 
C.  Recent Lackey Decisions: Supreme Court of the United States and 
Supreme Court of Missouri 
The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari in the case of 
Muhammad v. Florida in 2014.116  Muhammad was sentenced to death in 
1983 for the first-degree murder of James Burke after his trial counsel failed 
to present mitigating evidence.117  In his petition for certiorari to the Supreme 
Court for a stay of execution, after spending thirty years on death row,118 
 
 110. Id.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except 
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission tak-
en in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted un-
less a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 
 
Id. 
 111. Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 543. 
 112. Id. at 544. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  See Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459, 459 (1999) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). 
 115. Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 546. 
 116. Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894 (2014). 
 117. Initial Brief of Appellant at 2, Muhammad v. State, 22 So. 3d 538 (Fla. 2009) 
(No. SC09-170), 2009 WL 2001393 (June 22, 2009). 
 118. Execution List 2014, supra note 7. 
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Muhammad made a final appeal, relying on Lackey.119  Justice Breyer disa-
greed with the denial of certiorari, stating that he would grant the stay of exe-
cution and hear the petition limited to the Lackey claim.120 
The Supreme Court of Missouri heard the case of Walter Barton in early 
2014.121  Barton’s conviction for first-degree murder and subsequent sentence 
of death were affirmed on direct appeal.  Barton sought review by the Su-
preme Court of Missouri and brought several other claims, including the 
claim that it was unconstitutional to execute him after he had waited more 
than twenty years on death row.122  Barton claimed that this delay violated the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.123  The court held that this 
claim lacked merit because the cases Barton cited discussed the importance of 
sentencing procedures but did not address the delay between sentencing and 
execution.124  In a footnote, the court cited Lackey v. Texas and stated that 
Lackey did not support Barton’s position because only one or two Justices of 
the Supreme Court of the United States found the claim to have merit, and 
that all subsequent cases rejected this claim on its merits.125 
What does this calm rejection of the Lackey argument say about Mis-
souri?  As stated earlier, Missouri has been on an execution binge.  Then-
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Missouri, Mary Rhodes Russell, re-
cently discussed the “backlog” of prisoners on death row.126  She stated that it 
is “required by law that the Supreme Court . . . set execution dates,” and now 
that the controversy that surrounded certain lethal injection protocols has 
been resolved, executions can continue at their unrelenting pace.127  She 
claimed that she and the other judges on the court are just doing their job by 
 
 119. Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894 (2014); see Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 
1045 (1995). 
 120. Muhammad, 134 S. Ct. at 894. 
 121. Barton v. State, 432 S.W.3d 741 (Mo. 2014). 
 122. Id. at 749, 763. 
 123. Id. at 763. 
 124. Id. at 764 (citing Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991) and Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)). 
 125. Id. at 763 n.9 (citing Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992–93 n.4 (1999) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).  Even though the Supreme Court 
of Missouri continues to reject this claim, a Missouri case that rose to the Eighth Cir-
cuit discussed this claim in depth in 1998; and, though the Eighth Circuit found that 
the Lackey claim could not be raised by petitioner because procedurally barred, the 
court did find “that delay in capital cases is too long . . . [b]ut [that] delay . . . is a 
function of the desire of our courts . . . to get it right; . . . [to hear] any argument that 
might save someone’s life.”).  Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 
1998). 
 126. Mike Lear, Chief Justice: Executions Don’t Reflect On Her Term, Missouri 
High Court’s Ideology, MISSOURINET (June 30, 2015), http://www.missourinet.com/ 
2015/06/30/chief-justice-executions-dont-reflect-missouri-high-courts-ideology/. 
 127. Id. 
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setting execution dates because they must follow legislative policy.128  This 
argument is easily rejected by many other states that retain the death penalty 
yet choose to forgo imposing the sentence.129 
Former inmate, David Zink, was executed in Missouri on July 14, 2015, 
after spending more than a decade on death row.130  In David’s final words, 
he not only expressed sorrow for his victim and her family, but also men-
tioned the “serious flaws that offend the basic concept of the American Jus-
tice System.”131  In his final message to other death row inmates, David en-
couraged them to understand that everyone is going to die and to embrace the 
death penalty before society “figures it out” and condemns them to a linger-
ing death.132  The discussion of a lingering death is worth more than a mere 
footnote in a Supreme Court of Missouri decision, and to become so detached 
as to inspire the use of the word “backlog” to describe the elimination of peo-
ple should be a red flag in our society. 
D.  Jones v. Chappell: California District Court Decides Enough is 
Enough 
In Jones v. Chappell, Judge Cormac J. Carney, of the District Court for 
the Central District of California, wrote that since the death penalty was rein-
stated in California in 1978, over 900 persons have been sentenced to death, 
but out of those 900, only thirteen have been executed.133  Judge Carney 
found that a system that produces such results can only lead to a lengthy and 
inordinate delay.134  He found the amount of time California’s prisoners 
spend on death row to be so long that when, or if, execution comes, it will be 
arbitrarily inflicted and will have no retributive purpose.135  Judge Carney 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. For example, California retains hundreds on death row, but no one has been 
executed in eight years.  See Number of Executions by State and Region Since 
1976, supra note 4; Death Row Inmates by State and Size of Death Row by Year, 
supra note 9.  Also, Pennsylvania has over one hundred inmates on death row, but 
has not executed anyone in fifteen years.  See Number of Executions by State and 
Region Since 1976, supra note 4; Death Row Inmates by State and Size of Death 
Row by Year, supra note 9.   
 130. Associated Press, ‘Embrace Your Execution’: Missouri Rapist Uses Last 
Words to Tell Fellow Inmates it’s an Easier Form of Death than Serving Life Without 
Parole, DAILYMAIL, (July 14, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
3160279/Missouri-death-row-inmate-presses-appeals-clemency-bid.html. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F.Supp.3d 1050, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
 134. Id. at 1053. 
 135. Id.  Retribution is when punishment is “inflicted on someone as vengeance 
for a wrong or criminal act.” Retribution, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/retribution (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2015). 
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vacated Jones’s death sentence and declared California’s death penalty sys-
tem unconstitutional.136 
As one can imagine, this caused quite a stir for the California courts and 
left them in limbo about whether they should support or reject the death pen-
alty in their own courts.  This holding was met with considerable shock de-
spite the fact that not a single execution had taken place in California since 
2006.137  A poll was taken after this decision was handed down asking Cali-
fornians about their view on the death penalty.138  Fifty-six percent of Cali-
fornians surveyed still support the death penalty and wanted to keep it, which 
was the lowest support for the death penalty in California since 1965.139 
The California Attorney General has appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals to have the Jones decision overturned.140  The Ninth Circuit de-
nied the appeal, but after a re-filing by Ernest Jones, the Ninth Circuit will 
hear Jones’s habeas petition on the same grounds.141  One of the problems the 
Ninth Circuit will likely face when reviewing this case is how to rectify the 
delayed justice caused by California’s ineffective death penalty system.  
Lengthy appeals are not just brought before state courts, but before federal 
courts as well.142 
Judge Carney invalidated California’s death penalty scheme because of 
its lengthy delays in executing prisoners, but what about the federal delays 
 
 136. Jones, 31 F.Supp.3d at 1053. 
 137. Erik Eckholm & John Schwartz, California Death Penalty System Is Uncon-
stitutional, Federal Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2014/07/17/us/california-death-penalty-unconstitutional-federal-judge-
says.html?_r=0 (quoting Jones, 31 F.Supp.3d at 1053). 
 138. James Queally, Support for Death Penalty in California at Lowest Point in 
50 Years, LOS ANGELES TIMES, (Sept. 13, 2014, 3:54 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-california-death-penalty-support-
20140913-story.html. 
 139. Id.  The study was conducted by the Field Poll.  Id. 
 140. What’s the Likely Ninth Circuit Timeline for Deciding the Fate of Califor-
nia’s Death Penalty in Jones v. Chappell?, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY: AN 




 141. Jones, 31 F.Supp.3d 1050, appeal dismissed 14-56302 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 
2014).  Ernest Jones v. Ron Davis, 14-56373, hearing on Aug. 31, 2015 at 9:00 A.M. 




 142. James Ching, Ninth Circuit Preview: Jones v. Chappell Invalidates Califor-
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that makeup about fifty percent of time spent on death row?143  Is he also 
calling federal capital punishment laws into question?  This will be a difficult 
decision that the Ninth Circuit will inevitably have to face, but it will be most 
interesting to see if the Ninth Circuit chooses to side with the District Court 
and abolish the death penalty in California.  If the Ninth Circuit determines 
California’s death penalty is unconstitutional, the decision would be contrary 
to its own opinion in McKenzie v. Day, which stated that the Lackey Claim 
had too severe of policy implications,144 and would also be contradictory to 
its opinion in Smith v. Mahoney, which held that a Lackey claim would be 
procedurally barred under Teague v. Lane, since the Lackey claim was not 
brought in a state appeal.145 
Although the Jones decision is based on California’s inadequate death 
penalty system,146 there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that this situation 
could not be rectified by potentially reworking the system to be more produc-
tive.  If California’s death penalty system can be fixed, how should other 
states go about fixing their own systems?  If California’s death penalty sys-
tem cannot be fixed, is this the catalyst needed for other states to review their 
own death penalty systems and also rule them unconstitutional? 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1489 (9th Cir. 1995) (Norris, J., dissenting).  
Here the dissenting judge was disgruntled by the prosecution’s argument that a Lack-
ey claim had severe policy implications – the argument that this would affect poten-
tially thousands of inmates and cause large, statewide expense.  Id.  “Certainly the 
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Ed. . . . did not consider the inevitable – and 
clearly enormous – dislocation and administrative costs of desegregating the public 
schools when it decided that segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 145. Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (“In sum, a state court considering Smith’s [Lackey] 
claim at the time his conviction became final would not have felt compelled by exist-
ing precedent to conclude that the rule sought was required by the Constitution. . . . 
Enforcing the rule proposed by Smith would therefore ‘break[] new ground or im-
pose[] a new obligation on the States,’ . . . and we must therefore reject it.”). 
 146. Jones, 31 F.Supp.3d at 1053.  The Connecticut Supreme Court recently abol-
ished the state’s death penalty, citing in part the Jones and Lackey decisions.  State v. 
Santiago, No. 17413, 2015 WL 4771974, at *38 (Conn. Aug. 25, 2015).  The Court 
stated, “The . . . reason the death penalty has lost its retributive mooring in Connecti-
cut is that the lengthy if not interminable delays in carrying out capital sentences ‘do 
not just undermine the death penalty’s deterrent effect; they also spoil its capacity for 
satisfying retribution.’”  Id. (quoting DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION:   
AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION 45 (2010)) (citing Jones, 31 
F.Supp.3d at 1064).  Due to the important conversation occurring in Santiago, it is 
worthy of its own law summary. 
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
How does the Lackey issue get resolved?  One California District Court 
has decided to end the death penalty in California.  The American consensus 
is that the death penalty is an acceptable punishment, one that an inmate just-
ly deserves.147  Is the appropriate response to retract all appeals, to let the 
conviction and sentence stand after just one or maybe two appeals?  It is un-
likely the Supreme Court would accept a reduction in appeals because, 
“[D]eath is different.”148  Death is an irreversible punishment, so the courts 
need to make sure they get it right – that includes several rounds of ap-
peals.149  Then, it is possible that America accepts the lengthy stay on death 
row as an unfortunate, yet necessary, side effect to receiving a death sentence.  
But, how do other countries handle this necessary side effect? 
Even though American courts and legislators have only dabbled in the 
idea of lengthy stays on death row being unjust, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights took a more in-depth look at the issue in the case of Soering v. 
United Kingdom.150  In this case, the Commonwealth of Virginia wanted Soe-
ring, a native of Germany, for allegedly killing two people.151  After the pur-
ported crime, Soering fled to the United Kingdom.152  In an attempt to pre-
vent Soering’s extradition to the United States to face his capital charges, 
several advocacy groups wrote petitions, including one to the European 
Commission on Human Rights (“ECHR”).153  The ECHR halted the extradi-
tion until it could make a decision.154  In its decision, the ECHR decided that 
Soering could not be extradited to the United States because he would be 
tortured by “inhuman or degrading” treatment under U.S. laws.155 
Not only does the ECHR create strict guidelines for the death penalty,156 
it also does not permit the lengthy amount of time that a prisoner is forced to 
 
 147. Damla Ergun, New Low in Preference for the Death Penalty, ABC NEWS 
(Jun. 5, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/06/new-low-in-
preference-for-the-death-penalty/ (citing a poll that found fifty-two percent of people 
pick life in prison as the “preferred punishment,” whereas forty-two percent favor the 
death penalty). 
 148. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). 
 149. Teresa Lewis, Death Sentence Appeals Take Time for a Reason, 
LAWYERS.COM, http://criminal.lawyers.com/criminal-law-basics/death-sentence-
appeals-take-time-for-a-reason.html (last visited June 22, 2015). 
 150. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur.Ct.H.R. (1989). 
 151. Id. at 4. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 6–8, 1. 
 154. Id. at 2. 
 155. Id. at 27. 
 156. European Convention on Human Rights, sec. 1, art. 2 (Council of Europe 
1987) (“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.  No one shall be deprived 
of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”). 
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wait on death row.157  The ECHR found that due to the prisoner dwelling so 
long on death row, he would be forced to suffer “the anguish and mounting 
tension of living in the ever-present shadow of death.”158  Further, the ECHR 
agreed with Mr. Soering’s concerns about “death row phenomenon” and 
found that Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights would not 
allow the “mounting anguish of awaiting execution.”159  The ECHR conclud-
ed that the United Kingdom would not be able to extradite Soering to the 
United States without violating its obligations under Article 3.160 
Besides the ECHR, other international tribunals have taken an interest in 
the inordinate delay between sentencing and execution.  The highest court in 
Zimbabwe held that waiting just five or six years on death row amounted to 
torture and “inhuman or degrading punishment.”161  In India, the highest 
court declared that an appellate court must take into account the delay of exe-
cution when deciding whether to implement a death sentence.162  In Jamaica, 
the highest court held that any more than five years between sentencing and 
execution would be considered “inhuman punishment.”163  The Supreme 
Court of Canada, like the ECHR, refused to extradite a prisoner to the state of 
Washington unless the death penalty was no longer an available punishment 
because the average amount of time an inmate spent on death row was 11.2 
years (in 2001), which would cause “psychological trauma.”164  Similarly, the 
 
 157. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33 (1989). 
 158. Id. at 35. 
 159. Id. at 38.  See European Convention on Human Rights, sec. 1, art. 3 (Council 
of Europe, 1987) (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”). 
 
Death row phenomenon is used to describe the harmful effects of death row 
conditions, including exposure to extended periods of solitary confinement 
and the mental anxiety that prisoners experience whilst waiting for their death, 
whilst death row syndrome is used to describe the consequential psychological 
illness that can occur as a result of death row phenomenon. 
 
Dr. Karen Harrison & Anouska Tamony, Death Row Phenomenon, Death Row Syn-
drome, and Their Affect on Capital Cases in the US, INTERNET J. OF CRIM. (Oct. 
2010), at 1, 
http://www.internetjournalofcriminology.com/Harrison_Tamony_%20Death_Row_S
yndrome%20_IJC_Nov_2010.pdf. 
 160. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur.Ct.H.R. at 43 (1989). 
 161. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-
General, 1 Zimb. L.R. 239, 240, 269 (1993). 
 162. Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1983 S.C. 465. 
 163. Pratt and Morgan v. The Attorney General of Jamaica, 3 SLR 995, 2 AC 1, 4 
All ER 769 (Privy Council 1993) (en banc). 
 164. Minister of Justice v. Burns and Rafay, 2001 SCC 7 (S.C. Canada, 22 March 
2001) (at para. 122). 
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Supreme Court of Uganda held that a delay in execution that lasted more than 
three years amounted to inhuman or degrading punishment.165 
Even though American courts do not need to look to international tribu-
nals, on several occasions the Supreme Court of the United States has consid-
ered their holdings on several occasions.166  In Roper v. Simmons, when the 
Supreme Court struck down the death penalty for offenders under the age of 
eighteen, the Court stated that it references “the laws of other countries and . . 
. international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”167  The Su-
preme Court has a long history of applying standards from international 
courts similar to its own constitutional standards in similar circumstances.168  
The Court should take into account more frequently the international tribu-
nals’ holdings and consider how these foreign courts have dealt with the 
lengthy stay on death row.  The international community has already openly 
condemned the United States for its continued use of the death penalty.169  
Instead of affirmatively responding to the United Nations’ request to abolish 
the death penalty,170 the United States continues to be the only Westernized 
country that still supports capital punishment.171 
The international community provides three solutions to end the lengthy 
stay on death row: (1) put a cap on the number of years an inmate can spend 
on death row; (2) consider the length of time spent on death row when carry-
ing out an execution; and (3) abolish the death penalty.172  American courts 
have inferred that if a cap is placed on the number of years an inmate can 
spend on death row, then an inmate and his counsel will file for every appeal 
imaginable to make it past that arbitrary number.173  The same problem would 
occur with the second solution since the defendant would just look to the 
 
 165. Kigula and Others v. Attorney Gen., 2006 S. Ct. Const. App. No. 03, at 56–
57 (Uganda 2009). 
 166. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) (observing that 
felony murder has been restricted or eliminated entirely in a number of countries with 
a similar common law system); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) 
(noting that only three of sixty countries kept the death penalty as punishment for rape 
in 1965). 
 167. 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
 168. Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459, 463 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting the deni-
al of certiorari). 
 169. See Richard C. Dieter, The Death Penalty and Human Rights: U.S. Death 
Penalty and International Law, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., at 4–6, http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/Oxfordpaper.pdf (last visited June 22, 2015). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Figure 2 infra p. 920. 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 150–54. 
 173. See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1301 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“[There is nothing] in the American constitu-
tional tradition or in this Court’s precedent for the proposition that a defendant can 
avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain 
when his execution is delayed.”). 
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amount of time his jurisdiction has found to be too much time spent on death 
row and then continue his appeals until that arbitrary line has been crossed.174  
Kent Scheidegger, the legal director of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation 
does not find the Lackey claim to be a valid argument because a petitioner can 
continuously delay his own death with appeals and then use that delay as an 
excuse to vacate his death sentence.175  The solution he suggests is to have 
these inmates drop their appeals to speed up the appellate process,176 but it is 
unconscionable to ask someone not to fight for his life.  To cap the number of 
years an inmate can spend on death row leaves just a shadow of a penalty that 
no one will actually receive because only the threat of death remains, without 
the actual execution that has been agreed upon by judge and jury.177 
In Albert Camus’s essay, Reflections on the Guillotine, Camus discusses 
the sentence of death as a punishment and ultimately terms it: “[R]evenge.”178  
Camus did not believe that capital punishment is an appropriate response to 
murder.179  He found that murdering is inherent in the nature of man, but that 
the law should not attempt to emulate man’s nature.180  But, what Camus 
found more torturous and cruel than the premeditated murder that is capital 
punishment is the time between sentencing and execution.181  He wrote that a 
prisoner, who must wait an extended amount of time to receive his death sen-
tence, gets “a punishment more terrible than death, and one that was not im-
posed on the victim.”182  In America’s appellate system, the condemned have 
many avenues of appeals or stays via the state’s highest court, District Court, 
Court of Appeals, Supreme Court of the United States, stay from the gover-
nor, and so on.183  Camus would find these appeals appalling because each of 
these opportunities for relief would be a worse form of punishment, as it 
would cause “[t]orture through hope alternate[d] with the pangs of animal 
despair.”184  To Camus, knowing you are going to die is nothing compared to 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Adam Liptak, Lifelong Death Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/us/death-row-inmates-wait-years-before-
execution.html?_r=1&. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See supra text accompanying notes 7–8. 
 178. Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, 
AND DEATH 150 (Justin O’Brien, trans., The Modern Library 1963). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 152. 
 182. Id.  In a footnote to this quote, Camus wrote about Roemen, a French prison-
er, who waited 700 days between sentencing and execution: “Those condemned under 
common law, as a general rule, wait from three to six months for the morning of their 
death.”  Id. 
 183. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 184. Camus, supra note 178, at 152. 
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not knowing whether you are going to live.185  This is evident by Camus’s 
belief that: 
As a general rule, a man is undone by waiting for capital punishment 
well before he dies. Two deaths are inflicted on him, the first being 
worse than the second, whereas he killed but once. Compared to such 
torture, the penalty of retaliation seems like a civilized law. It never 
claimed that the man who gouged out one of his brother’s eyes should 
be totally blinded.186 
Camus makes a valid observation that still holds true to America’s death 
penalty today.  The United States not only allows an inmate to suffer from the 
knowledge of his impending doom, but, in a few states, also follows through 
with that threatened promise.  If America is going to make changes to allevi-
ate some of the unnecessary suffering that accompanies a protracted stay on 
death row, it needs to act now while so many currently toil there.  A blind eye 
can no longer be turned to what is actually going on behind bars.  The solu-
tion to ending a lengthy stay on death row is the abolishment of the death 
penalty. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Americans have a deep-rooted belief in justice.  They believe that when 
an inmate has been sentenced to death, justice has been served.  But, are ju-
rors made aware that the death sentence, a sentence they gave in the name of 
justice, does not occur for many years to come, if it occurs at all?  Would 
American jurors still see justice in death knowing of its delay in delivery and 
the additional psychological trauma that accompanies that delay? 
A lengthy stay on death row is not a notion that is going to melt the 
hearts of Americans for some of the worst criminals in our country.  That 
being said, the lengthy stay is a thought-provoking idea that forces philoso-
phers, doctors, policy makers, and victims’ families, as part of a twelve-
person jury, to ask themselves: What are we really doing to these inmates?  
What really happens between sentencing and execution?  As the dissenting 
judge in Ross v. State commented, 
After the execution, what will the state . . . have gained from all of 
this?  The answer seems to be that, minimally, the state has secured 
the proverbial pound of flesh for the crimes of this one outrageously 
cruel man.  But now, what is to be?  Has our thirst for this ultimate 
 
 185. Id. at 152–53. (“‘Knowing that you are going to die is nothing,’ said a con-
demned man in Fresnes.  ‘But not knowing whether or not you are going to live, 
that’s terror and anguish.’”). 
 186. Id. at 156. 
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penalty now been slaked, or do we, the people . . . continue down this 





 187. State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131, 154 (Conn. 2003) (Norcott, J., dissenting). 
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